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- | ===Emotions=== | + | ====Emotions==== |
Although there is not an accurate and well-agreed upon definition for emotions; Scherer illustrated emotions in a insightful profound way describing how emotions cognitively emerge in the following: | Although there is not an accurate and well-agreed upon definition for emotions; Scherer illustrated emotions in a insightful profound way describing how emotions cognitively emerge in the following: | ||
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Many theories discuss how emotions are elicited in our cognitive system. Discrete Emotions theories (Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Wiens, 2004) argue that emotions are a set of sensory-motor programs; each of these programs consists of a brain circuit linking eliciting cognitions and somatic responses into a single neural system. While Dimension theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) argue that emotions are cognitive labels to physiological activation, which are characterized in terms of broad bipolar dimensions such as valence and arousal (e.g. I feel negative arousal in a context where I’ve been wronged, therefore I must be angry) Invalid source specified.. In the 1980s Appraisal Theories became a major perspective for emotions studies. | Many theories discuss how emotions are elicited in our cognitive system. Discrete Emotions theories (Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Wiens, 2004) argue that emotions are a set of sensory-motor programs; each of these programs consists of a brain circuit linking eliciting cognitions and somatic responses into a single neural system. While Dimension theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) argue that emotions are cognitive labels to physiological activation, which are characterized in terms of broad bipolar dimensions such as valence and arousal (e.g. I feel negative arousal in a context where I’ve been wronged, therefore I must be angry) Invalid source specified.. In the 1980s Appraisal Theories became a major perspective for emotions studies. | ||
- | ===Emotions Theories=== | + | ====Emotions Theories==== |
It essential to review the history of proposed theories when studying emotions models. The work of (Moors, 2009) reviews many theories mentioned in this paragraph. | It essential to review the history of proposed theories when studying emotions models. The work of (Moors, 2009) reviews many theories mentioned in this paragraph. | ||
- James’ Theory (1890) argues that a stimulus activates bodily response, the experience and feed back of this response produces the emotional response and experience. The intensity and type of emotion relies on the intensity and type of bodily response. Nevertheless, | - James’ Theory (1890) argues that a stimulus activates bodily response, the experience and feed back of this response produces the emotional response and experience. The intensity and type of emotion relies on the intensity and type of bodily response. Nevertheless, | ||
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The multi-stage account uses both universal elicitors (e.g., novelty, threat level, pleasantness, | The multi-stage account uses both universal elicitors (e.g., novelty, threat level, pleasantness, | ||
The resulting affective states are used in the rules selecting the agent’s goals and actions; they influence the speed and capacity of MAMID architecture modules; they influence ranking like determining whether a specific cue or situation is processed, or specific goal selected. | The resulting affective states are used in the rules selecting the agent’s goals and actions; they influence the speed and capacity of MAMID architecture modules; they influence ranking like determining whether a specific cue or situation is processed, or specific goal selected. | ||
+ | MAMID architecture uses the model suggested by (Hudlicka, 2002; 1998) that maps specific states/ | ||
+ | An example is mentioned in the work Invalid source specified.: for a high trait and state anxiety and fear individual, reduced attention and working memory are mapped and reflected onto a limited working memory capacity of the architecture modules resulting in reducing the number of processed data like cues, situations and expectations. Threat bias is modeled by higher ranking of threatening cues and by higher ranking of threatening situations and expectations. | ||
+ | In this architecture it is easy to model different trait profiles and integrate existing profile like “obsessive-compulsive”. Moreover it can easily integrate conflicting emotions and traits for artificial agents just like in humans. | ||
+ | This method is a psychotherapy treatment through VR. Below is an example of actions controlled by MAMID in a “Fear of public speaking” application. | ||
+ | This example is used in building virtual characters and avatars to treat patients with social phobia. These avatars will evoke the undesired symptoms in the patient (like being negative and aggressive toward the speaking patient). Once these symptoms are identified, the patient is treated wit the appropriate therapeutic interventions (e.g., cognitive restructuring, | ||
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+ | ====Bibliography==== | ||
+ | Öhman, , A., and S. Wiens. "The concept of an evolved fear module and cognitive theories of anxiety." | ||
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+ | Aitken, P. P. " | ||
+ | Bartneck, Christoph. " | ||
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+ | Ekman, P. "An argument for basic emotions." | ||
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+ | Elliott, C. "The affective reasoner: A process model of emotions in a multi-agent system (Ph.D Dissertation No. 32). ." Northwestern, | ||
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+ | Gratch, Jonathan, Stacy Marsella, and Paolo Petta. " | ||
+ | Hudlicka, Eva. "A Computational Model of Emotion and Personality: | ||
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+ | Hudlicka, Eva. " | ||
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+ | Hudlicka, Eva. "This time with feeling: Integrated Model of Trait and State Effects on Cognition and Behavior." | ||
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+ | Kuppens, P., I. Van Mechelen, and D. J. M. Smits. "The appraisal basis of anger: Specificity, | ||
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+ | Lazarus, R. S. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. | ||
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+ | Lazarus, R. S. " | ||
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+ | LeDoux, J. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. | ||
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+ | Roseman, I. J. "A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research, and applications." | ||
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+ | Roseman, I. J., and C. A. Smith. " | ||
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+ | Scherer, K. R. " | ||
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+ | Scherer, K. R. "On the sequential nature of appraisal processes: Indirect evidence from a recognition task." In Cognition and Emotion, 13, 763–793. 1999. | ||
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+ | Silvia, P. J. " | ||
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+ | Smith, C. A., and L. D. Kirby. " | ||