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Many theories discuss how emotions are elicited in our cognitive system. Discrete Emotions theories (Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Wiens, 2004) argue that emotions are a set of sensory-motor programs; each of these programs consists of a brain circuit linking eliciting cognitions and somatic responses into a single neural system. While Dimension theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) argue that emotions are cognitive labels to physiological activation, which are characterized in terms of broad bipolar dimensions such as valence and arousal (e.g. I feel negative arousal in a context where I’ve been wronged, therefore I must be angry) Invalid source specified.. In the 1980s Appraisal Theories became a major perspective for emotions studies. | Many theories discuss how emotions are elicited in our cognitive system. Discrete Emotions theories (Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Wiens, 2004) argue that emotions are a set of sensory-motor programs; each of these programs consists of a brain circuit linking eliciting cognitions and somatic responses into a single neural system. While Dimension theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) argue that emotions are cognitive labels to physiological activation, which are characterized in terms of broad bipolar dimensions such as valence and arousal (e.g. I feel negative arousal in a context where I’ve been wronged, therefore I must be angry) Invalid source specified.. In the 1980s Appraisal Theories became a major perspective for emotions studies. | ||
- | ====Emotions Theories==== | + | ===Emotions Theories=== |
- | It essential to review the history of proposed theories when studying emotions models. The work of (Moors, 2009) reviews many theories mentioned | + | It essential to review the history of proposed theories when studying emotions models. The work of (Moors, 2009) reviews many theories mentioned |
- | - James’ Theory (1890) argues that a stimulus activates bodily response, the experience and feed back of this response produces the emotional response and experience. The intensity and type of emotion relies on the intensity and type of bodily response. Nevertheless, | + | |
- | - Schachter (1964) considered Cannon’s criticism and stated that a stimulus causes a physiological arousal. This arousal is cognitively mapped to the corresponding emotional experience and its type while the intensity of the arousal defines the intensity of the emotion. In this theory, emotional experience is equated to feeling just like in James’. | + | ==James’ Theory (1890)== |
- | - Appraisal Theories: studies | + | It argues that a stimulus activates bodily response, the experience and feed back of this response produces the emotional response and experience. The intensity and type of emotion relies on the intensity and type of bodily response. Nevertheless, |
+ | |||
+ | ==Schachter (1964)== | ||
+ | This theory | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Appraisal Theories== | ||
+ | Studies | ||
Appraisal theories propose multi-mode for the functioning and processing of appraisal. This model relies on rule-based mechanisms that compute variables and combine them to elicit appropriate emotions, and associative mechanisms (e.g. Clore & Ortony, 2000;) that retrieve previous pervious appraisal patterns. | Appraisal theories propose multi-mode for the functioning and processing of appraisal. This model relies on rule-based mechanisms that compute variables and combine them to elicit appropriate emotions, and associative mechanisms (e.g. Clore & Ortony, 2000;) that retrieve previous pervious appraisal patterns. | ||
- | - Network theories: consider associative methods in emotion elicitations as those theories relate to semantic network models and memories (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; Bower, 1981; Lang, 1985; Leventhal, 1980, 1984). When an emotional experience is evoked, the stimuli, actions, goals and responses are saved in the memory in a specific schema network for each emotion. Every time a stimulus is encountered, | + | |
+ | ==Network theories== | ||
+ | These theories | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Affect Program theory== | ||
+ | Emotions generation involves processes of stimulus evaluation, which is the focus of appraisal theories, and then translating the evaluation into emotion and consequences, | ||
+ | There is a list of evidences for this theory from which we mention: | ||
+ | - Neurological evidence for specialized emotion neural circuits (Panksepp, 1998, 2000) | ||
+ | - Existence of emotion specific responses, which are also universal (Ekman, 1972) | ||
+ | It is note-worthy that this theory is compatible with the theories previously mentioned. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Barrett’s Conceptual Act theory== | ||
+ | Barrett (2006b) builds her theory on Russell’s (2003) who argues against the notion that basic emotions are building blocks of emotional life, and he states that emotional variables of valence and arousal are the building blocks. These variables are properties of stimuli, neurophysiological states and of conscious experience. The combination of these variables is called “affective quality” which causes a state called “core affect”. Specific emotions are in this case the categorization of core affect, which are not naturally given rather they socially emerge. Barrett agrees with Russell that emotions are not natural and that stimuli elicit core affect. Barrett states that categorization of core affect is a form of perception that helps shaping the emotional experience. This categorization is affected by previous conceptual knowledge and thus she uses the term conceptual act to denote it. Category representation knowledge is perceptual because it has sensory features, embodied as its activation simulates previous instances of the same category, and situated according to contexts. Emotion categories are essential part of emotional experience in this theory, while in appraisal theories emotion category is a consequent of emotional experience. Like theories of James (1890) and Schachter (1964), this theory equate emotion with emotional experience and hence could be also called feeling theory. | ||
===Appraisal Theories=== | ===Appraisal Theories=== | ||
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- | Bibliography | + | ====Bibliography==== |
Öhman, , A., and S. Wiens. "The concept of an evolved fear module and cognitive theories of anxiety." | Öhman, , A., and S. Wiens. "The concept of an evolved fear module and cognitive theories of anxiety." | ||
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Aitken, P. P. " | Aitken, P. P. " | ||
Bartneck, Christoph. " | Bartneck, Christoph. " | ||
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Ekman, P. "An argument for basic emotions." | Ekman, P. "An argument for basic emotions." | ||
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Elliott, C. "The affective reasoner: A process model of emotions in a multi-agent system (Ph.D Dissertation No. 32). ." Northwestern, | Elliott, C. "The affective reasoner: A process model of emotions in a multi-agent system (Ph.D Dissertation No. 32). ." Northwestern, | ||
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Gratch, Jonathan, Stacy Marsella, and Paolo Petta. " | Gratch, Jonathan, Stacy Marsella, and Paolo Petta. " | ||
Hudlicka, Eva. "A Computational Model of Emotion and Personality: | Hudlicka, Eva. "A Computational Model of Emotion and Personality: | ||
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Hudlicka, Eva. " | Hudlicka, Eva. " | ||
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Hudlicka, Eva. "This time with feeling: Integrated Model of Trait and State Effects on Cognition and Behavior." | Hudlicka, Eva. "This time with feeling: Integrated Model of Trait and State Effects on Cognition and Behavior." | ||
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Kuppens, P., I. Van Mechelen, and D. J. M. Smits. "The appraisal basis of anger: Specificity, | Kuppens, P., I. Van Mechelen, and D. J. M. Smits. "The appraisal basis of anger: Specificity, | ||
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Lazarus, R. S. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. | Lazarus, R. S. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. | ||
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Lazarus, R. S. " | Lazarus, R. S. " | ||
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LeDoux, J. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. | LeDoux, J. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. | ||
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Roseman, I. J. "A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research, and applications." | Roseman, I. J. "A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research, and applications." | ||
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Roseman, I. J., and C. A. Smith. " | Roseman, I. J., and C. A. Smith. " | ||
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Scherer, K. R. " | Scherer, K. R. " | ||
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Scherer, K. R. "On the sequential nature of appraisal processes: Indirect evidence from a recognition task." In Cognition and Emotion, 13, 763–793. 1999. | Scherer, K. R. "On the sequential nature of appraisal processes: Indirect evidence from a recognition task." In Cognition and Emotion, 13, 763–793. 1999. | ||
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Silvia, P. J. " | Silvia, P. J. " | ||
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Smith, C. A., and L. D. Kirby. " | Smith, C. A., and L. D. Kirby. " | ||